This is my the body of my dissertation (submitted in my last year at Brighton University (2009)), about the societal effects and responses Emo music and fashion for which I received a first. It’s now on the shelf in Brighton University library. I’ve not included the literature review, bibliography or abstract but these are available on request if required.
IT’S NOT A FASHION STATEMENT, IT’S A DEATHWISH: UNDERSTANDING EMO
WELCOME TO THE BLACK PARADE: Understanding the ambiguity of Emo as a subculture
Before the subcultural work of Cohen and Hebdige can be applied to Emo, the ambiguity of the term (and that which the term entails) must first be addressed. Should Emo simply be understood as “a music genre that has influenced a way of dress” as Alatareil (2006; whatsemo.com) contends or does the term extend to include a lifestyle that can be construed as subcultural? If Emo does indeed encapsulate the historical characteristics of a subculture, this thesis shall prove imperative as a contemporary comprehension of how the media both constructs and reacts to the emergence of subcultures, the behaviour of the associated folk devils and if this media reaction has changed throughout time. Understanding the historical, social and cultural elements that equate the emergence of Emo is also significant when analysing the reaction of the media – what parts of the current social climate constitute the basis for claims regarding the new faction?
Greenwald construes emo’s sudden detonation into the mainstream as a result of media outlets searching for a new fad post the 9/11 terrorist attacks, stating the following:
The media business, so desperate for its self-obsessed, post 9/11 predictions of a return to austerity and the death of irony to come true, had found its next big thing. But it was barely a “thing,” because no one had heard of it, and those who had couldn’t define it. Despite the fact that the hedonistic, materialistic hip-hop of Nelly was still dominating the charts, magazine readers in the summer of ‘02 were informed that the nation was deep in an introverted healing process, and the way it was healing was by wearing thick black glasses and vintage striped shirts. Emo, we were told, would heal us all through fashion.
(2003, p.69)
The relationship between youth, subculture and citizenship has been underwritten since September 11. The focus has been on insiders and outsiders, patriots and insurgents. Youth has been an underplayed category. In parallel, the music industry has been agitated through illegal downloading communities (Michaels, 2008b). The available of an array of music has meant that definitive alliances between and identity and music have been more difficult to draw and construct. In this political and musical ambiguity, Emo has been situated. Working the space between subculture, fashion and musical style, returning Emo to central attention raises an awareness of what has happened to theories of both identity and politics. Even if Emo should not be understood as a subculture, Hesmondhalgh (2005) offers genre as a necessary way in which to think about the relationships between music and the social (p.32).
Significantly, the entry for Emo and its history on Wikipedia.org – increasingly becoming the first call of reference for information online for many subjects (Woodson, 2007) – is almost totally comprised from Andy Greenwald’s book Nothing Feels Good (2003). It would appear that this is where many that write about the topic of Emo are sourcing their information, including Ryalls (2009) and university lecturer Marilyn Palmer (2008), admitting in her thesis that what she knows of the topic comes from little more than a Google search, which includes the Wikipedia entry as a result (p. 2). Whilst the information provided on this website compiled of user-generated content may not be accurate (Disclaimer; Wikipedia, 2009), it is responsible for creating a dominant discourse. As such, Greendwald’s account can almost be considered as definitive in regards to comprehending the historical origins of emo music (especially when taking note also of the numerous direct citations to Greenwald’s work, including Simon and Kelley (2007), Bailey (2005) and Aslaksen (2006)).
Although the origins of the term “emo” itself are “shrouded in mystery” (Greenwald, 2003, p. 24), it is rarely disputed that Emo as a music genre emerged from a fashionable, American music scene in the 1980s known as “hardcore” that according to Greenwald, was led and popularised by Washington D.C band, Minor Threat (ibid, p. 9). Hardcore was a sound that encompassed cathartic energy and monochromatic beats within short bursts of song (ibid) and performance of such music aimed to erase the forth wall between the stage and the audience through implementation of extensive audience interaction (ibid, page 10).
Guy Picciotto was one fan of Minor Threat, inspired enough by their music to form a band; Rites of Spring, to create similar music with a different aim; “to confront and break down the limitations of the self” (ibid, pages 11-12). This sound proved popular and as a result, an influx of bands with similar musical style emerged (ibid, page 14). “Emocore” became the moniker applied to these numerous bands that were influenced by the punk attributes of hardcore music but which also incorporated distinctly emotive lyrics and vocals (ibid). Dischord Records was the independent record label that dominated this scene at the time (ibid, page 10). Today however, major record labels also fund “emo” music, much of which currently has an obvious pop influence; My Chemical Romance signed to Reprise Records (parent owned by Warner Music Group) and The All American Rejects on Interscope (subsidiary of Universal Music Group) are two examples (Pivovarov, 2009). Ryalls contends that this recent delineation between music considered emo in the early nineties and eighties compared to the contemporary, more accessible perception, is causal to Emo’s development into a subculture today (2009, p.3).
Gelder (2007) charts six key conventions for identifying and comprehending subculture, not all of which are straightforwardly applicable to the notion of Emo. Firstly, members of subcultures have (arguably) historically held negative, idle and parasitic attitudes towards work and employment (2007; prelim.), a trait that Gelder suggests was first detectable in mid-sixteenth-century London via the popularisation of ‘rogue literature’ (ibid, p. 5). This literature spoke of the emerging criminal underworld in which vagrants and thieves “used disguise, rhetorical play and counterfeit gestures to insinuate themselves into lawful and political contexts”, rather than functioning through legitimate routes (Dionne and Mentz, 2004, in; ibid). Emo encompasses a young demographic, many of which are yet to encounter – and therefore have little opportunity to revolt against - many regimes of the working environment. This criterion is also paradox to the numerous newspaper reports regarding two thirteen year old English disciples of emo who committed suicide in 2008; Hannah Bond, reputed as a “model pupil” (Levy, 2008) and Sam Leeson, described as “bright” (Wostear, 2008). Secondly, Gelder notes that subcultures have been understood in terms of their “negative or ambivalent relation to class” (2007, prelim). A recurrent assertion within news and journal articles alike is that emo youth (and artists (Aslaksen, 2006)) are typically from middle class backgrounds, whether situated in America (ibid), Mexico (Cervallos, 2008) or the UK (Phillips, 2008 and Kelley, 2008). Subcultures have historically been transcendent to class affiliations “as a result of the particular adjustments the [subculture has] made”, or what Karl Marx names lumpenproletariat; self-interested groups of people lacking class consciousness (Gelder, ibid, p.3). If subculture has historically been subordinate to hierarchal class boundaries and Emo is in fact middle class dominated, this criterion does not support the notion of Emo as a subculture.
The “refusal of the banalities of ordinary life and massification” is the third subcultural convention (Gelder; prelim). Initially, this is seemingly not pertinent to the contemporary notion of Emo considering the chart success of bands construed as emo today such as My Chemical Romance and Fall Out Boy (see Macadam, 2006). The popular fashion trends deemed as emo, such as skinny jeans and black nail varnish (Mills, 2008, p. 42-43)), are readily available in great volume on the high street. Such trends have also been recently sported by mainstream celebrities such as pop singer Ashlee Simpson and fashion model Kate Moss respectively, both of which have no immediate involvement in the emo music scene (houseofemo.com, 2009). It is difficult to determine at this stage whether this means that the style of emo has become disconnected from the supposed ‘subculture’ of the notion, or if the ease of popularising these styles confirm that Emo was never a subculture in the first instance. Although undoubtedly a cultural conflict between the hippies in the 60s and the “defenders of the establishment” existed, there was “never any tension between the values of the counterculture and the functional requirements of the capitalistic economic system” when their associated commodities hit the shelves (Heath and Potter, 2005, p. 5). Ever increasing western consumption – along with the availability of alternative choices being the very heart and drive of capitalism (ibid, p.4) - obviously equates to faster market reproduction of the ‘alternative’ and therefore, the more abrupt announcement of new subcultures today, such as Emo. This pattern may be one possible factor for such great media panic regarding the trend). Nonetheless, it is the intention of emos to express their individuality (“just like every other emo kid” as Mills, 2008 notes (p.40)) that is important for comprehending this criterions ability to also connote Emo as a subculture.
The penultimate two subcultural conventions noted by Gelder are inexorably linked in the case of Emo; the movement “away from the home into non-domestic forms of belonging” and group association with particular territories (for example, the ‘street’, ‘hood’ etc), as opposed to particular property (Gelder; prelim). The venues hosting live performances of ‘emo’ artists seem the obvious location to commence when applying these two protocols to Emo. Mills describes these gigs as a “heaven” for emo youth in his humoristic account (ibid, p. 56) and in Greenwald’s more heralded text, the group response to the music at his first Dashboard Confessional show is construed as a connecting process of “emoting” (Greenwald, ibid; p. x-xi). The protest held in London on May 31st, 2008 by fans to defend against Sarah Sands/The Daily Mail’s claims about Emo and My Chemical Romance can also be considered as a event of non-domestic belonging, since the emos involved spent the duration socialising and embracing with each other, despite the majority never meeting previous to the event (Fitzsimmons, 2008). It is however the internet that appears to be the most dominant territory for emos. This not only connoted by newspaper claims that this is where emos gather to “learn how to be emo” (Rodriguez, 2005), compare “the scars on their wrists” (Sands, 2006) and “talk about death and the glamorisation of hanging” (Alleyne, 2008), but also by Simon and Kelley who devote a chapter to the phenomenon (with particular focus on how emos should personalise (read as ‘territorialise’) their profiles on social networking website MySpace.com) in their “essential” guide to emo culture (p. 73-101). Kelley even argues that Emo is “one hundred percent” web-driven, stating that “[emos] live online [spending] more time online than they do at shows and record stores” (in; Kirsch, 2006). Numerous websites also exist specifically to indulge online emo communities via the use of message boards (these include emocorner.com, luv-emo.com and soEmo.co.uk).
Gelder’s final subcultural conventions is the element of excess or exaggeration, most easily identified within the dress and behaviour of microcosms and paradox to “the restraints and moderations of ‘normal’ populations” (ibid, p.4). Within Emo fashion, the supposed preoccupation with black clothing (Sands, 2006, Cervallos, 2008 etc) and visually obscuring haircuts (Mills, ibid, p.42) can be understood as extreme by some, even if other elements of the style have become massified. There appears a distinct clash of discourse however regarding the emotional behaviour of emo youth. Ryalls (2009) –after studying the profiles of emos on social networking site makeoutclub.com – concluded that those involved in the Emo scene “appear to be “normal” teenagers struggling with the common problems of adolescence” and although embracing their emotions, do not appear to be caught within extreme or problematic depression (p. 12). Similarly, Greenwald was pleasantly surprised by the polite behaviour of those in attendance of his first emo gig, commenting that “the kids, it appears, are all right” (2003, ix). However, we cannot ignore that emos are “also depicted as sad loners who supposedly spend all their time sitting indoors cutting themselves” (Baker 2008) due to a fascination with “depression, self-harm and suicidal thoughts” (Cervallos, 2008). As Baker also notes, both imageries cannot be true (ibid). Neither Greenwald (in his classic account) or Simon and Kelley (in their “essential guide”) mention self harm as a trait of emos. It can be contended then, that these authors are either denying the practise or it is not applicable to Emo. There are a number of factors supporting the argument that self harm amongst youth is not a result of enrolment within the subculture. Firstly, many emos contend that,
saying that [emo] is a “celebration of self harm”, dangerous and increasing [rates of teenage suicide] is a ridiculous exaggeration with no proven research. People who are emo are not depressed all the time, and they certainly do not condone suicide and self mutilation, only a hand full of radicals, just like any sub-culture.
(soEmo.co.uk, 2009)
Next, music magazines such as weekly rock rag Kerrang! have defended the culture (most predominantly in 2006 after Sands (2006) article caused such commotion amongst emo youth). Although it made sense financially to support the increasingly popular genre at the time, it is unlikely that the periodical would affiliate or agree with the argument that it was damaging to its readers. Lastly, an online investigation reveals that it is largely tabloid news websites disseminating derogatory themes regarding Emo (significant given the claims that the internet is the favoured domain for emos). This would seem to correlate with McRobbie’s assertion that the media construct moral panics daily to “make home and social affairs newsworthy” (1995 in; Critcher, 2006, p.266). The simplest way to do this is through sensationalistic journalism.
Although Emo is arguably not a subculture when taking the majority of Gelder’s (2007) subcultural criterion into account, it is important to ascertain whether that which is considered subculture needs to provide or represent positivity beyond that of community, such as Emo provides its followers predominantly through the presence of the microcosm online. Tuckman seems correct to assume that “emos are happy to admit that they have no ideology beyond insisting on their right to do what they want” (2008). Here it can be understood that a subculture does not necessarily have to ‘mean’ anything in and of itself – paradox to the (mis)representation and attention given to youth subcultures by journalists and academics alike. Academics and journalists alike wish to appropriate meaning upon youth and their trends since it is far more difficult for the powerful to comprehend and/or dictate mass opinion if they ostensibly do not understand particular areas of youth ideology and discourse.
THANK YOU FOR THE VENOM: Are Emos the new Folk Devill?
In his study of the UK phenomenon of the Mods and Rockers in the 1960s, Cohen contends the value of anthropological studies of disasters to the analysis of moral panics (Cohen, 1972, p.12). Unlike the amplification model (discussed in the literature review of this thesis), the standardised seven stage model distinguished for the examination of disasters does not centralise the media as causal of the panic and instead sees all social spaces – and the reaction of these spaces - as interrelational (Hetherington, 2000 in; Gelder, 2005, p.247). Cohen found that numerous stages of the model were not directly applicable to the panic caused by the Mods and Rockers and thus condensed the framework to provide “a useful analogue” for application to moral panics (Cohen, ibid, p.13). The appropriated stages – Warning, Impact, Inventory and Reaction initially propel and then attempt to squander and/or control moral panics within a society. If Emo adheres similarly to these different criterion then ‘emos’ can arguably be interpreted as a group of new contemporary folk devils and therefore, Cohen’s theorem may prove a solid foundation for comprehending modern mediated and societal reactions to subculture. Significantly, folk devils have historically been understood as the scape goats for larger societal issues and concerns. By also investigating the situatedness of Emo in the current social and political environment, this chapter aims to judge the relevance of Cohen’s 1971 case study to contemporary notions of subculture, whilst questioning the effects (if any) that the eradication of Emo would have on societies panicked by the conception.
The warning phase has held great magnitude for disaster researches since “reactions to warnings are crucial in determining the effects of [a] disaster” (Cohen, 1972, p.120). Cohen states that there appeared minimal warning previous to the initial mods and rockers – albeit minor - collision on Clacton beach in 1964 and instead, it appeared that it was the “inventory build-up” and the subsequent reactions and events to this that was responsible for disseminating threats which became “generally believed” (ibid, p.121). The emergence of the moral panic regarding Emo would seem to have appeared similarly, since the warning phase occurs “based on conditions out of which danger may arise” (ibid, p.12). The claims made by Sands’ in her infamous newspaper article seemed to stem from dangers not immediately linked to Emo but rather, obscure connections to social trends of the time. The apparent popularisation of “matured” Goth-influenced fashion trends (Baker, 2006 and Barton, 2006) may have sat uncomfortably with the Daily Mail’s Conservative positioning. The rise of online social networking websites not only offered a site for self expression (for emo youth or otherwise) but also a stimulation for associated fears of online dangers for youth (see; CEOPO, 2006). The lack of warning preceding publication of the Daily Mail article appears to correlate with the contention made in the previous chapter that Emo itself was never encompassed a real threat to begin with. This perhaps lessened the “immediate, unorganised response” (or, the ‘Impact’ phase) of Emo’s emergence (Cohen, 1972, p. 12) and instead, it would seems that the ‘dangers’ of the trend became exemplified via the reaction phase of the disaster model. The foundations for Sands’ claims (although arguably sensationalistic) can now be understood by applying the inventory phase of disaster theory to Emo.
The inventory phase of the disaster model is one characterised by exaggeration and distortion and occurs when those exposed to the disaster “begin to form a preliminary picture of what has happened and of their own condition” (Cohen, 1972, p.12). This phase sees the assembly of supposed characteristics become transformed into symbolisations for prediction of the time and location that the debacle shall next arise. When newspapers would refer to other beaches as “another Clacton” in their reports on the subsequent mods and rockers standoffs, discourses persistently mobilised of “violent gangs of newly affluent youngsters with no respect for authority travelling down from London to inflict expensive damage on seaside resorts” (Aldridge, 1994, p.37). Although rarely these claims or predictions were accurately realised with news reporters and photographers often sent chasing “false tip-offs” (Cohen, ibid, p.27), they provided a good grounding for banal news coverage (Aldridge, ibid). Cohen states that there appears to be three stages to the process of symbolisation:
[…] a word (“Mod”) becomes symbolic of a certain status (delinquent or deviant); objects (hairstyle, clothing) symbolise the word; the objects themselves become symbolic of the status (and the emotions attached to the status).
(ibid)
‘Emo’ has become symbolic of a “dangerous”, “depressed” and “cult” status and as such has become a term of abuse and like many other folk devil labels, has become seen as a “distinct type of personality” (ibid, p. 28). This is predominantly due to Sands’ infamous article but these associations can also be located in reports by – but not limited to - Whitehouse (2006), Kelly (2008) and Rawstorne (2008). Like that of the mods and rockers, the style of the subculture has become inextricably linked with the primary word. Long fringes and ‘skinny’ jeans are two good examples of this. The former has been associated with the depressive emotional state of emos, Mills stating that they would “rather be 90 per cent blind than deal with the world” (2008, p.42). Simon and Kelley concurringly declare that those “born an emo type” will often “feel like an awkward social outcast” and that their hair will no doubt reflect this (2007, p.53). News reports regarding the suicides of emo youth have highlighted the decision of the victims to start wearing skinny jeans prior to their deaths, insinuating that the garment reflects the hypothetical, negative behavioural tendencies of Emo (Savil, 2008 and Rawstorne, 2008). Both trends also arguably adhere to the notion of ‘cult’ through the devotional practise of these fashions within Emo. Now wherever the style of Emo can be located, so can the negative connotations that those who are involved are emotionally defunct whilst encouraging the exhibition of this through dress and the act of self harm. It is, however, the “presence of predictions which can be disastrous” (Cohen, ibid, p.26). After the initial Mods and Rockers confrontation at Clacton, television interviews occurred with the involved youth, investigating their plans for future conflicts and revenge. This no doubt encouraged subsequent events (ibid). The connection made between Emo and self harm has not only raised concern amongst news journalists and their target readership but also emo youth themselves. Gerard Way - vocalist for My Chemical Romance – summarises the concern suitably:
I would hate it if anyone thought they had to do something like cut themselves in order to fit in at one of [My Chemical Romance’s] shows.
(In; Kerrang!, issue: 1127, 2006)
That group identity is often confused with group behaviour, in correlation with the deviation amplification notion discussed within the literature review, equated a qualm that the discussion of supposed self harm amongst My Chemical Romance fans and within the popular teenage clique could cause impressionable youth to also partake in the activity. This compelled fans of the band and Emo enough to hold the “friendliest protest London has ever seen” outside the Daily Mail headquarters on the 31st May, 2008 - almost two years after the publication of Sands’ article (Stokes; in Press Gazette, 2008). This protest was a significant event which fuelled further ideological perceptions of Emo. Cohen contends that the reaction phase to social deviance occurs in two forms. The first is the process of “the images in the inventory [becoming] crystallised into more organised opinions and attitudes” via the formation of generalised belief systems (Smelser, 1962 in; Cohen, 1972, p.35). Since “the cognitive beliefs or delusions transmitted by the mass media and assimilated in terms of predisposition” (Cohen, ibid) it is useful to look to the social and political climates in which Emo has materialised for deeper comprehension of these reactions.
Post protest, rather than simply disregard Sands’ article as sensationalistic journalism, numerous UK journalists (including Kelly, 2008 and Fitzsimmons 2008a) decided to again discuss her statements without resolution, thus furthering the ambiguity and concern affiliated with the subculture. This decision coincides with Cohen’s statement that often “people talk less about the event and more about the implications of it” (Cohen, ibid). Even those who denied the claims as “pure bigotry” (Rauf, 2008) did little to restrict the dissemination of the derogatory discourse simply by their reporting of that which Sands previously maintained. As a result, Emo continued to be linked to further social deviances, including murder, from the Mirror article entitled “Prozac teenager Ed Belben stabbed dad to death” (McGurran, 2009) - and cannibalism. The latter originated as a hoax headline on thespoof.com, home of the “funniest spoof headlines” (2009) and was published online shortly after as genuine news by tabloid newspaper The Sun (Staff Reporter, 2009). If it were not for the process of sensitisation which “transforms an ambiguous situation into an absolutely potent generalised threat” (Cohen, p.59), that the murderous teen was supposedly emo would likely never have been mentioned and the ludicrous nature of the cannibalism story would have been recognised. The second element of Cohen’s reaction phase is the attempt to control or contain the disaster in question, either socially or through official agents of control (ibid). Although numerous anti-emo websites were created in 2008 - including anti-emo.com, waragainstemos.com and emodanger.co.cc - these would appear to offer little more than a space for its creators and members to discuss their objection of the teen movement as opposed to an attempt of actual implemented social control. The desire of some to abolish the trend can also be located within online games where hostility and harm to emos is the central theme (see “Kill the Emo” and “Slit Your Wrists!” in; newgrounds.com, 2008), again providing “visual reminders of what we should not be” (Cohen, 1972, p.2). In Mexico, such hostility was reported as expressed via aggressive anti-emo gangs who would target emos and violently beat them (Cevallos, 2008), a reaction which seemingly corresponds with the social and political climate of Mexico.
Mexico has marked social inequalities which is a feature of emerging countries (CEELBAS, 2009). It is made worse by extensive corruption, in both public and private life. This fierce reaction is perhaps also a reflection that only 21.3% of Mexico’s population is connected to the internet and therefore lack both the access to online outlets of resentment and further – albeit, rather vague – information regarding the subculture compared to the US (69.9% online connectivity) and the UK (62.3%)(CNNmoney, 2009). Victor Mendoza, a youth worker in Mexico, contends that homophobia was at the core of the gang violence stating that it was “not a battle between music styles at all [but rather] the conservative side of Mexican society fighting against something different” (in; Grillo, 2008). Similarly to the case of the Mods and Rockers, the involvement of the Mexican official agents of social control was “limited to rule enforcement, rather than the creation of new rules” (Cohen, 1972, p.89). However, when “expressing psychological emotions is not forbidden by law” (Gilvich (drummer for “emo” band MAIO) in; Shuster, 2008), it is reasonably difficult for even the official agents of control to contain the supposed threat, let alone the societal efforts. Interestingly, new legislations have been suggested in Russia by the Sate’s Duma to prohibit the “dangerous teen trend” of Emo (Shuster, 2008) a reflection perhaps of the country’s “increasingly totalitarian” political ethos (Felgenhaur, 2008). Russian emos have been linked to discourses of immortality and “an allergy to happiness” (The Other Russia, 2008). Approval of the proposed legislation would mean the banning of both emo music and aesthetics from the country – with particular focus within schools and government buildings - in order to stunt the negative influences that “emo ideology” has upon “the unformed teenage psyche” (The Other Russia, ibid). The digital divide would appear relevant here similarly, with a mere 19.5% of Russia’s population presently connected to the internet (CNNmoney, 2009), though those who are online can expect heavy future regulation of emo websites if the proposed legislation is approved (NME, 2008b). This abolishment arguably reflects the country’s communist history and Russia’s rejection of western Cultural imperialism as a country still trying to prove itself as a powerful eastern nation after previous economic collapse. Here we can understand the effect of different political climates upon formation of reactions to Emo.
In 2006, it was found that the UK has the highest self harm rate across Europe (mentalhealth.org) though the act has been on the increase far longer. BBC News stated that rates of self harm had sharply increased over the past decade in 2004.This is no doubt a concern that requires discussion though there is a fear that talking about self harm in schools will only further encourage the act (Sugden, 2008). By associating the act with the site of Emo however, an opportunity arises in which to acknowledge the act with all blame directly pointed at the youth trend, as opposed to the increased educational and aesthetic pressures and plausible neglect of the mental health of western youth who have become to interpret self harm as a “normal way of managing stress” (ibid). This use of emos as scape goats for greater societal issues, in addition to the successful application of Cohen’s appropriated disaster theorem to discourses of Emo, would suggest that emos are indeed identifiable as contemporary ‘folk devils’ and that Cohen’s 1971 mods and rockers case study continues as` relevant to the comprehension of emerging subcultures.
Unlike the case of the mods and rockers, it was not an actual event that sparked the moral panic regarding Emo but rather an infamous, poorly researched and sensationalistic news article based on little else than Sand’s detection of a new adolescent trend. It would appear that in the ever increasing mediated contemporary climate that exaggerating that which can be considered dangerous has become effortless - and perhaps even imperative - within the competitive news industry. Proposed abolishment of Emo music and its aesthetics equates a doubtful route for reducing the increasing trend of self harm amongst youth since there is no solid evidence to support a direct correlation, only speculation. Therefore, future sects of folk devil are likely to also become identified and then pinpointed as causal for this particular deviance, as well as other notions of deviance too.
VAMPIRE’S WILL NEVER HURT YOU: Emo and the Semiotic approach to subculture
The semiotic approach to subcultural style seeks to understand the manner of its composition (the relationship between signifier and signified), its meaning and its cultural significance (Gelder, 2005, p.274). The semiotic approach was deployed by Dick Hebdige to analyse the fashion of punk. The appropriateness of this approach is clear as Emo is historically tethered to punk and therefore, a matching of research methods may also be relevant. Through application of Hebdiges’ framework to discourses of Emo and its style, it can be understood more clearly how the aesthetics of Emo – despite its commodified, almost mainstream and high street presence – can continue to cause alarm to those outside of the subcultural microcosm. If Hebdige’s semiotic theorisation of subculture is not applicable to the site of Emo, it will be imperative to explore the reasons for which it configures a pivot of historical change.
Since language is of all social institutions and is least amenable as revolutionary (Saussure, 1974 in; Hebdige, 1979, p. 90), it is the visual codes of style which most immediately resonate its ideology to those outside of the subculture. Certain aesthetics of Emo seem all too familiar however. Despite Emo descending from punk, its style has equated the dominant comparison of the subculture as a “cheap imitation of Goth” (see Sands, 2006, Alleyne, 2008, Beattie, 2009 etc.), a discourse no doubt fuelled by the online popularity of the 2005 song Emo Kid by comedy band Adam and Andrew, which uses the previous quotation as a lyric (MySpace.com/adamandandrew, 2009). Emos have acted as bricoleurs through their seizure of particular Goth signifiers (for example, heavy incorporation of black clothing and excessive makeup), revisualising the imagery once influenced by nineteenth century gothic literature, horror movies (Siegel, 2005, p.10) and to a lesser extent, BDSM culture (Wilson, 2008) to instead represent the “inner despair” of the emotionally defunct individuals said to comprise the Emo scene (Sands, 2006). Particular punk fashions have also been incorporated by Emo similarly, including studded belts, piercings and androgyny (Thomas, 2001). This amalgamation of numerous subcultural symbols, although apparently suitable to a subculture obscure as Emo, not only equates an ambiguous style but potential for conflicting connotations as to what emos stand for, which is also causal to confusion and then panic. Hebdige contends that punk’s various stylistic ensembles were “undoubtedly expressive of genuine aggression, frustration and anxiety” and “symptomised a whole cluster of contemporary problems”, making the subculture attractive and simple to join for youth (1979, p.87). Emo’s conveyance of punk ideology via its style combined with that of Goth, which connotes paradox “unemotional, detached [and] unmoved” attitudes (BBC, 2000), equates a more broadly attractive subculture and thus Emo’s phenomenal contemporary emergence. It is imperative to recognise however that the appropriation of these symbols is a likely result of economical logic, for it is less problematic to remarket the alternative fashions already in existence then to construct a new visual image from scratch for the ambiguous subcultural notion. Lefebvre (1971) states that once reviled symbols become cultural consumer goods, consumption “engulfs that which was intended to give meaning and direction” (in; Hebdige, 1979, p. 92). Despite the popular and commercial nature of emo fashion, the signs incorporated must contain significant ideological meaning to the subculture in question. This is best understood via a process known as homology.
Paul Willis first applied the term ‘homology’ to subculture in his 1978 study of hippies and motor-bike boys using it to describe the “symbolic fit between the values and life-styles of a group, its subjective experience and the musical forms it uses to express or reinforce its focal concerns” (in; Hebdige, 1979, p. 113). Paradox to the popular contention that subcultures equate “lawless forms”, Willis explains that each segment of a subculture is actually “characterised by an extreme orderliness” (ibid). The way in which these segments interrelate is central for how the members of subcultures “make sense of the world” (ibid). It was, for example, the homology between an alternative value system (‘Tune in, turn on, drop out’), hallucinogenic drugs and acid rock which equated a “way of life” for the hippy movement (ibid). In Resistance Through Rituals, Hall (et. al, 1976) it was contended that the symbols appropriated into the skinheads stylistic ensembles were “made to reflect, express and resonate…aspects of group life”, expressing “hardness, masculinity and working-classness” through the appropriation of boots, braces and cropped hair, therefore forging a unity between the aesthetics and the ideological ethos of the subculture (in; Hebdige, ibid, p.114). The case of punk works similarly since its members wore clothes which were “the sartorial equivalent of swear words”, homogenous with the frustration causal to punk’s emergence and the music created by the movement (Hebdige, ibid). It is not unreasonable then, that the spectacular of Emo has too been seen as reflective and homogenous with the “emotionally charged” nature of emo music (Mills, 2008, p.7) and the dominant understanding of depression as a core value of Emo ideology (Simon and Kelley, 2007, p.2). If however, the emo kids are in fact “alright” (Greenwald, 2003, p. ix) then their style is unlikely implemented as a result of these values of “introversion”, “gloom” and heightened sensitivity (Mills, 2008, p.9, p.8 and p.62 respectively). Like the example of punk, extracting a final set of meanings from the appropriated signifiers of emo style “seems doomed to failure” due to the polysemic nature of semiotics (Hebdige, ibid, p.117). An alternative semiotic approach (principally associated with the Tel Quel group in France) recognises style as signifying practise (bid). Kriteva (1975) defines signifying practise as “the setting in place and cutting through or traversing of a system of signs” (in; ibid, p.120). Routed in engagement with filmic and literary texts, this approach sees the notion of art as work, as “practise” and as a “particular transformation of reality, a version of reality, an account of reality” (Harvey (BFI), 1978 in; ibid). The focus is not placed on the ways in which a final sign is read but rather, the process of the transformation of meaning (Hebdige, ibid). Instead of stressing linguistic structures (“langue”), it is instead more useful to look to the process of meaning construction (“parole’”) and the position in which Emo has risen (ibid, p.118). As Hebdige states, `meaning evaporates` in the questioning of the line between signification and reality (ibid, p.117).
Interestingly, back in 2003 Seawell stated that Emo dress was “characterized as distinctly non-fashionable, keeping with the movement’s theme of showing little to no interest in all aspects of society”. As the Emo subculture has grown in popularity, so too it can be argued has the desire of those involved in the tribe to announce themselves as different to those who look in on the clique from the outside. The appropriation of signifiers that have caused alarm in the past seems an obvious route for an emerging subculture, particularly when these have already undergone the process of massification and are readily available for purchase. More recently, Ryalls contended that Emo is “a subculture built on the subversion of dominant teen popularity” (2007, p.2). The punk and Goth signifiers borrowed by Emo are the stylistic opposites of that expected of the most popular youth cliques; presenting an arguable “sophistication and depth lacking in the blonde, bouncy chav faces [that] dominate our television screens and nightclubs” (Sands, 2006). Similar to the punks use of the swastika, which was employed simply because “punks like to be hated” (Time Out, 1977 in; Hebdige, ibid) and the symbol was “guaranteed to shock” (ibid, p.116), it would seem that Emo has merged past subculture signifiers with its style because they continue to mark ‘difference’ to those outside of the groups that actualise them. According to the alternative semiotic approach, there can no longer be any absolute distinction between the ‘form’ and ‘content’ of a work of art (ibid, p.118). This is based on MacCabe’s premise that the notion of a “neutral” environment for the implementation of signs is illusory, since the aesthetic of realism “denies its own status as articulation…the real is not articulated it is” (1974 in; ibid). To elaborate, although in reality Emo is likely a “harmless youth movement” (Kelly, 2008), through its apparently purposeful requisition of previous stylistic signs which connote ‘difference’, the subculture has also become to encompass the same negative colouring and reaction that both Goth and punk vogue received; namely, that the group is dangerous and poses a societal threat. Until discourses of Emo and its ideology become clearer to those external - and even internal - to the microcosm, these established visual translations will continue to dominate and obscure any intended purpose or meaning behind Emo dress. Any attempt by emos to express their “intensively sensitive soul[s]” (Fendrich, 2008) via dress has effectively failed in the wake of the negative connotations of past subcultural aesthetics mirrored by Emo. Despite Heath and Potters previously mentioned theory of co-optation (see Literature Review) and Mills’ contention that Emo equates a market “cash cow” (2008, p.51), the supposed threat of the subculture can not yet be digested or rationalised, even with its arguable commercial power. The fear caused by the ambiguous ideological foundation and sensationalist journalism regarding Emo is perceptibly not decreased via Emo’s additional, unclear appropriation and ineffective transformation of past subcultural signs.
Hebdige’s semiotic approach to subculture has provided a useful framework in which to discuss the form of Emo style and more specifically, the relationship between the subculture’s appropriated signs and that which can be connoted via these signs. Similar to past subcultural movements, the members of Emo have acted as bricoleurs; finding new ways to incorporate particular signs into the aesthetics of their contemporary symbolic environment. Rather than seeking revolutionary inspiration however, emos have instead turned to the high street and its readily purchasable, existing symbols of ‘difference’; no doubt a result of our increasingly commoditised sense of identity in capitalistic milieu. It is difficult to detect whether the fashion of Emo is homogenous with the subculture’s core values, considering Emo’s ambiguous ideological foundation in the first instance and that the Emo aesthetic resembles that of past subcultures so closely. Although Hebdige’s Subculture: The Meaning of Style (1979) will continue to provide a strong starting point for the comprehension of spectacular subcultures, the influence of past subcultural dress and the commodification of such will likely obscure the intended significance of appropriated symbols and also therefore, the possibility of thorough understanding of these emerging subcultures.
FAMOUS LAST WORDS: CONCLUSIONS
Although the historical roots of Emo as a musical genre are well established, the contemporary interpretation of the notion as a subculture is often very ambiguous and this has no doubt complicated my research. Although Emo does not straightforwardly adhere to all of the six subcultural conventions outlined by Gelder (2007), the notion can arguably be understood as a subculture due to the attempt of emos to mark themselves as different via their aesthetics and by the sense of community that Emo offers its members, predominantly online. It would seem that contemporary subcultures like Emo need not offer radical ideology or action regarding the structures of class or employment but rather, a potential space for acceptance and kinship. Emo has been affiliated with the problems of depression and self harm amongst youth, for both journalists and academics need to appropriate meaning to youth trends, since these are far easier to explain and dictate to others than if these trends were in fact insignificant.
The application of past subcultural literature is useful for determining how Emo has emerged so notoriously and with such alarmed reactions from the mass media and society alike. Through applying Cohen’s (1972) condensed anthropological disaster model, similarities can be marked between the reactions to the mods and rockers in the mid 1960s and Emo today. The Warning phase of each microcosm’s impact has been minor. Instead, it has been the build up of the subsequent Inventory andReaction phases in both instances that have shaped the supposed threats that have become synonymous with each subculture. After the initial (and minor) mods and rockers clash at Clacton in 1964, further coastal conflicts were provoked due to the interference of the press, increasing the poignancy that the two opposed groups equated a violent societal threat. For Emo, it was after the conception of Sarah Sands’ sensationalistic, notorious 2006 Daily Mail article that the stereotype of emotionally defunct, self harming and death obsessed emos became so apparent. Like the mods and rockers, emos have emerged as the contemporary scapegoats for greater societal problems. Emos have become the folk devils presented as responsible for the continually increasing levels of self harm amongst teens predominantly, though associations have also been made between the subculture and online dangers for youth, and to a far lesser extent; murder and cannibalism. It is not surprising that the most extreme reactions to Emo have occurred in Russia and Mexico. Emos have emerged as hate figures amongst the homophobic of Mexico and the youth trend is facing complete abolishment in increasingly totalitarian Russia. It is worth noting that both countries have a low percentage of online connectivity and therefore, lower access to and comprehension of the largely online phenomenon.
Dick Hebdige’s (1979) semiotic approach to subculture has aided the comprehension of the composition of Emo style and its cultural significance. Rather than an inventive appropriation of signs by Emo’s aesthetics, members of the subculture have instead acted as bricoleurs using a number of signs incorporated previously by Goth and Punk, readily available in mass for purchase on the high street. As a result of this bricolage, past negative connotations such as Goth’s predominantly black aesthetics signifying an obsession with death and the edgy aesthetic of Punk signifying social aggression have arguable resonance within Emo, conflicting with the group’s defence that they are in no way a detrimental movement.
The ad hoc style of Emo would seem homogenous with the subculture’s obscure, non-radical ideological foundation, obligating emos to amalgamate the symbols of previous subcultures to announce themselves as ‘different’ and as a subculture to those outside of the microcosm. This correlates with MacCabe’s (1974) premise that there is no such thing as a neutral environment for the implementation of signs. Any attempt by emos to transform that which is indicated by these embezzled aesthetics however, has effectively failed in the wake of past connotations of subcultural style and this obviously does little to pacify the concerns regarding Emo and its members.
Hebdige (1979, p.87) contends that subcultures are most attractive to youth when they are easily accessible for potential, new members. As a result of a style that is easily attainable for continually increasingly affluent youth due to previous commodification of Punk and Goth aesthetics, the popularity of Emo has seemingly exploded almost overnight. The identity of Emo can be simply purchased, since the group seems to encompass no ideology than expressing faux individuality as yet one more typical, hormonal teen. Emo’s large following has no doubt contributed to the panic regarding the subculture, as has the occasional success of the movement in mainstream music. Increasing commercialism in the capitalistic west will likely see future subcultures emerge with similar velocity as Emo and with comparable levels of misconception from journalists, academics and society alike.
Although I have successfully addressed the research questions of this thesis through the application of past subcultural theories to much literature regarding the topic of Emo, the large majority of these texts have been crafted by those looking in on the subculture from the outside. This means that the real voice of Emo - from those that live the notion - does not have equal opportunity to be heard; to deny or squander the simulacrum that has been created for them. This is the main limitation of my chosen research method; discourse analysis. Therefore, if I were to continue exploring the topic of Emo in future, I would endeavour to carry out primary, qualitative research - perhaps in the form of focus groups - with a number of individuals who consider themselves to be involved in the teenage clique.
